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service providers and raters. In some embodiments, the 
method can identify malicious behavior and accordingly 
adjust the trustworthiness value for raters associated with 
malicious behavior. 
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SYSTEMS AND METHODS FOR PROVIDING 
REPUTATION MANAGEMENT 
CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED 
APPLICATIONS 
This application claims a benefit, under 35 U.S.C. § 119( e ), 
of U.S. Provisional Application Ser. No. 61/505,767, filed 8 
Jul. 2011, the entire contents and substance of which are 
hereby incorporated by reference. 
BACKGROUND 
1. Technical Field 
Various embodiments of the disclosed technology relate to 
reputation management and, more particularly, to systems 
and methods for reputation management in an online envi-
ronment. 
2. Description of Related Art 
The primary goals of a reputation management scheme are 
determining the service quality of the peers who provide a 
service (i.e., service providers) by using feedback from the 
peers who have rated the service (i.e., raters); and determining 
the trustworthiness of the raters by analyzing the feedback 
they provide about the service providers. Thus, the success of 
a reputation management scheme depends on the robustness 
of the mechanism to accurately evaluate the reputations of the 
service providers and the trustworthiness of the raters. 
As in every security system, trust and reputation manage-
ment systems are subject to malicious behaviors. Malicious 
raters may attack particular service providers (e.g., sellers) to 
undermine their reputations while helping other service pro-
viders by boosting their reputations. Malicious service pro-
viders may also provide good service qualities (or sell high-
quality products) to certain customers in order to keep their 
reputations high while cheating other customers unlikely to 
provide feedback. Moreover, malicious raters or service pro-
viders may collaboratively mount sophisticated attack strat-
egies by exploiting their prior knowledge about the reputation 
mechanism. Hence, building a resilient trust and reputation 
management system that is robust against malicious activities 
is a challenging issue. 
Various systems exist for enabling reputation management 
between service providers and users, but the current systems 
lack several benefits of embodiments of the present disclosed 
technology. Conventional reputation management schemes 
include global reputation management schemes where the 
reputation of a service provider is based on ratings from 
general users. Many of the prior global reputation manage-
ment schemes used by many well known web sites such as 
eBay®, Amazon® Epinions®, and AllExperts™ mostly 
compute the average (or weighted average) of the ratings 
received for a peer (or product) to evaluate the global reputa-
tion of the peer. Hence, these schemes are vulnerable to 
collaborative attacks by malicious peers. 
Moreover, a reputation management scheme should be 
efficient. A scheme high in computational complexity runs 
the risk of becoming out-of-date for failing to keep up with 
incoming ratings data. For example, in Histos the central 
node/server keeps all the ratings between the peers and gen-
erates a graph to calculate the ratings of each peer for the other 
peers. (G. Zacharia, A. Moukas, and P. Maes, "Collaborative 
Reputation Mechanisms in Electronic Marketplaces," in 
Proc. 32ndAnn. Hawaii Int'! Conj System Sciences (HICSS 
2 
'99), 1999). However, each update of this graph requires 
many computations. Hence, this scheme is burdened by high-
computational complexity. 
SUMMARY 
There is a need for efficient, reliable, and scalable reputa-
tion management schemes that resist impact from user dis-
honesty and unreliability and are resilient to malicious 
10 attacks. 
Exemplary embodiments of the present invention can 
include reputation management systems and methods. 
According to an exemplary embodiment, the reputation man-
agement method can include receiving a plurality of ratings. 
15 Each rating can be associated with a service provider and a 
rater. The method can further include modeling the service 
providers, the raters, and the ratings as a factor graph repre-
senting the factorization of a joint probability distribution 
function of variables, calculating the marginal distributions 
20 using a belief propagation algorithm applied to the factor 
graph, and determining reputation values associated with the 
service providers and trustworthiness values associated with 
the raters based on the calculating. 
Each factor node of the factor graph can correspond to a 
25 rater and be associated with a local function representing 
marginal distributions of a subset of the variables. The subset 
of variables can include a trustworthiness value associated 
with the rater and one or more ratings associated with the 
rater. Each variable node of the factor graph can correspond to 
30 a service provider and each service provider can be associated 
with a reputation value. 
Calculating can include iteratively passing messages 
between factor nodes and variable nodes connected by an 
edge. An edge can connect a factor node and a variable node 
35 and can represent one or more ratings associated with a rater 
and a service provider corresponding to the factor node and 
variable node, respectively. Messages can be passed until a 
termination condition is reached. The termination condition 
can be reached when the determined reputation values for one 
40 or more of the service providers remain constant between at 
least two iterations. Alternatively, the termination condition 
can be reached after a certain number of iterations. 
A message from a variable node to the factor node can 
represent a probability that a reputation value associated with 
45 the corresponding service provider equals a certain value at a 
current iteration. A message from a factor node to a variable 
node represents a probability that a reputation value associ-
ated with a corresponding service provider equals a certain 
value given one or more ratings between the corresponding 
50 service provider and a corresponding rater and the trustwor-
thiness value associated with the corresponding rater at the 
current iteration. 
The method can further include receiving an additional 
rating associated with a first service provider and a first rater 
55 and updating an edge corresponding to the first service pro-
vider and first rater based on the additional rating and a 
priority factor. The priority factor can be based at least par-
tially on a time elapsed since receiving a prior rating associ-
ated with the first service provider and the first rater. In 
60 another embodiment, the priority factor can give greater 
importance to more recent ratings. 
In further embodiments, the computational complexity of 
calculating can be linear in the number of service providers 
and raters. The belief propagation algorithm can be in log 
65 domain. The mean absolute error of the determined reputa-
tion values can be less than or equal to a predetermined error 
threshold E for each of the service providers. The service 
US 8,606,831 B2 
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providers and raters can be sellers and buyers. Alternatively 
the service providers and raters can be nodes on a computer 
network. 
According to another exemplary embodiment, the reputa-
tion management system can comprise a plurality of service 
providers, a plurality of raters, a ratings collection unit, and a 
reputation management unit. Each service provider can be 
associated with a reputation value and each rater can be 
associated with a trustworthiness value. The ratings collec-
tion unit can be configured to receive ratings, each rating 
associated with a service provider from the plurality of ser-
vice providers and a rater from the plurality of raters. The 
reputation management unit can be configured to calculate 
reputation values and trustworthiness values using a belief 
propagation algorithm. 
In further embodiments, the reputation management unit 
can be configured to calculate reputation values in slotted 
time. Alternatively, the ratings collection unit can be config-
ured to receive ratings and the reputation management unit 
can be configured to calculate reputation values in real time. 
One or more service providers can be raters. The system can 
be configured to flag raters that have a trustworthiness value 
lower than a predetermined threshold. The system can also be 
configured to filter malicious ratings associated with a 
flagged rater. 
These and other objects, features, and advantages of the 
reputation management systems and methods will become 
more apparent upon reading the following specification in 
conjunction with the accompanying drawing figures. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES 
FIG. 1 illustrates the diagram of a reputation management 
system, according to an exemplary embodiment of the 
present disclosed technology. 
FIG. 2 illustrates a representation of service providers and 
raters together with their associated relations as a factor 
graph, according to an exemplary embodiment of the dis-
closed technology. 
4 
cious under the RepTrap attack, according to an exemplary 
embodiment of the present disclosed technology. 
FIG. 11 illustrates a simulation of the average number of 
iterations versus time for an exemplary BP-ITRM when W of 
the existing raters become malicious under the RepTrap 
attack, according to an exemplary embodiment of the present 
disclosed technology. 
FIG.12 illustrates a simulation of the MAE performance of 
various schemes when 30 percent of the existing raters 
10 become malicious under the Rep Trap attack, according to an 
exemplary embodiment of the present disclosed technology. 
FIG.13 illustrates a simulation of the MAE performance of 
an exemplary BP-ITRM versus time when W of the existing 
raters become malicious and rating values are integers from 
15 {1, ... , 5} under the RepTrap attack, according to an exem-
plary embodiment of the present disclosed technology. 
FIG.14 illustrates a simulation of the MAE performance of 
various schemes when 30 percent of the existing raters 
become malicious andrating values are from { 1; ... ; 5} under 
20 the RepTrap attack, according to an exemplary embodiment 
of the present disclosed technology. 
FIG.15 illustrates a simulation of the MAE performance of 
various schemes when 30 percent of the newcomer raters are 
malicious and rating values are from { 1 ; ... ; 5}, according to 
25 an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosed technol-
ogy. 
30 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
To facilitate an understanding of the principles and features 
of the disclosed technology, various illustrative embodiments 
are explained below. Exemplary embodiments of the dis-
closed technology comprise systems and methods for provid-
ing reputation management, such as seller/buyer ratings man-
35 agement for online marketplaces. In particular, embodiments 
of the systems and methods are described in the context of 
global trust and reputation management schemes imple-
mented in a web environment. Embodiments of the disclosed 
FIG. 3 illustrates an example factor graph, according an 40 
exemplary embodiment of the disclosed technology. 
technology, however, are not limited to this context. Rather, 
embodiments of the disclosed technology may be utilized 
through various communications media such as local area 
FIG. 4 illustrates a message transfer from factor node k to 
variable node a at the vth iteration, according to an exemplary 
embodiment of the disclosed technology. 
FIG. 5 illustrates a message transfer from the variable node 45 
a to the factor node k at the vth iteration, according to an 
exemplary embodiment of the disclosed technology. 
FIG. 6 illustrates the probability of an exemplary 
BP-ITRM to satisfy Condition 1 versus different fractions of 
malicious raters, according to an exemplary embodiment of 50 
the disclosed technology. 
networks, and in various applications such online services, 
mobile ad-hoc networks, and peer-to-peer systems. 
The components described hereinafter as making up vari-
ous elements of the disclosed technology are intended to be 
illustrative and not restrictive. Many suitable components that 
would perform the same or similar functions as components 
described herein are intended to be embraced within the 
scope of the reputation management systems. Such other 
components not described herein may include, but are not 
limited to, for example, components developed after devel-
opment of the disclosed technology. It is also to be understood 
that the mention of one or more method steps does not pre-
clude the presence of additional method steps or intervening 
FIG. 7 illustrates the probability of an exemplary 
BP-ITRM being an E-optimal scheme versus different frac-
tions of malicious raters forthree different E values, according 
to an exemplary embodiment of the disclosed technology. 55 method steps between those steps expressly identified. 
FIG. 8 illustrates the average E values (EaJ for which an 
exemplary BP-ITRM is an E-optimal scheme with high prob-
ability for different fractions of malicious raters, according to 
an exemplary embodiment of the disclosed technology. 
FIG. 9 illustrates a simulation of the MAE performance of 60 
an exemplary BP-ITRM versus time when W of the existing 
raters become malicious under the Rep Trap attack, according 
to an exemplary embodiment of the present disclosed tech-
nology. 
FIG. 10 illustrates a simulation of the change in average 65 
trustworthiness of malicious raters versus time for an exem-
plary BP-ITRM when W of the existing raters become mali-
The disclosed technology introduces a reputation manage-
ment scheme called "Belief Propagation-Based Iterative 
Trust and Reputation Management Scheme," or BP-ITRM. 
BP-ITRM can provide a probabilistic approach to the repu-
tation management problem by applying the belief propaga-
tion algorithm in the design and evaluation of trust and repu-
tation management systems. Belief propagation is a message 
passing algorithm for performing interface on graphical mod-
els such as factor graphs, Bayesian networks, or Markov 
random fields. It can be used for computing marginal distri-
butions of unobserved nodes conditioned on the observed 
ones. 
US 8,606,831 B2 
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Ratings can be posted to or submitted through the web. As 
shown in FIG. 1, in an exemplary embodiment, a central 
authority 140 provided by one or more servers 150 can 
receive one or more ratings of service providers from raters 
120. For example, after the provision of a live information 
service, a rater 120 (e.g., user) can provide online feedback 
about the service provider 110. The central authority 140 can 
collect the ratings for a service provider and update the repu-
tation of the service providers based on the ratings. In some 
BP-ITRM is the first application of the belief propagation 
algoritlnn to trust and reputation management systems. The 
disclosed technology is related to graph-based iterative 
probabilistic decoding of low-density parity-check (LDPC) 
codes. In LDPC, one of the goals is to find the decoding error 
for a fixed set of check constraints. Similarly, in the reputation 
management scheme, a goal is to specify the regions of trust 
for the set of the system parameters. A region of trust can be 
the range of parameters for which the reputation values within 
a given error bound can be determined. However, the appli-
cation of the belief propagation algoritlnn to reputation man-
agement is harder problem than with LDPC codes as the 
adversary dynamics are far more complicated to analyze than 
the erasure channel in the coding problem. 
10 embodiments the central authority 140 can comprise a ratings 
collection unit 141 and/or a reputation management unit 142. 
Raters may provide inaccurate ratings for providers. More-
over, malicious raters 121 may intentionally provide errone-
ous ratings in an attempt to unfairly skew the reputations of 
BP-ITRM can compute reputation values of service pro-
viders accurately in a short amount of time. The scheme can 
also provide a robust and efficient methodology for detecting 
and filtering out malicious ratings. Further, the scheme can 
detect malicious raters with a high accuracy, and update their 
trustworthiness, accordingly forcing malicious raters to 
execute low-grade attacks to remain undercover. Thus, BP-
ITRM can significantly outperform the existing and com-
monly used reputation management techniques such as Aver-
aging Scheme, Bayesian Approach, and Cluster Filtering 
while under attack from malicious raters. 
15 one or more service providers 110. Thus, a reputation man-
agement scheme can also maintain a trustworthiness value for 
raters to mitigate the effect of unreliable and malicious rat-
ings. In some cases, raters may also work together to increase 
the effect of their ratings on the reputation of a service pro-
20 vider. As shown in FIG. 1, malicious groups of raters 122 can 
collude to attempt to unfairly skew the reputation of a service 
provider through a variety of techniques, including bad-
mouthing and ballot-stuffing. 
The disclosed technology enables a reputation manage-
Embodiments of the disclosed technology can approach 
reputation management as an inference problem that can be 
solved by computing marginal likelihood distributions from 
complicated multivariate global functions.Although comput-
ing marginal distributions can generally require summing an 
exponentially large number of terms, the belief propagation 
algoritlnn can be used to efficiently (e.g., in linear complex-
ity) compute these marginal probability distributions. 
25 ment scheme for computing reputation values of service pro-
viders accurately in a short amount of time. The scheme can 
also provide a robust and efficient methodology for detecting 
and filtering out malicious ratings. Further, the scheme can 
detect malicious raters with a high accuracy, and update their 
30 trustworthiness, accordingly forcing malicious raters to 
execute low-grade attacks to remain undercover 
Referring now to the figures, in which like reference 35 
numerals represent like parts throughout the views, various 
embodiments of reputation management schemes will be 
described in detail. 
II. BP-ITRMALGORITHM 
In some embodiments of the disclosed technology, the 
relationship between service providers ("SPs") 110 and raters 
120 can be represented mathematically. For example, a repu-
tation management system can comprise two different sets: a 
set of service providers, S; and a set ofraters, U. These sets are 
I.OVERVIEW 40 not necessarily disjoint, although they can be. In an exem-
plary embodiment, a service provider can also be a rater and 
In some service systems, the consumer of the service (e.g., 
the buyer) has no choice but to rely on the reputation of the 
service provider (e.g., the seller) based on the consumer's 
prior experience with that service provider. A reputation man- 45 
agement scheme is a promising method to aid the consumer 
vice versa. 
G1 can represent the reputation value of SP j (jES), and T iJ 
can represent the rating that rater i (iEU) reports about SP j 
whenever a transaction is completed between the two peers. 
R, can denote the trustworthiness of the peer i (iEU) as a rater. 
In other words, R, can represent the amount of confidence that 
a reputation system has about the correctness of any feed-
back/rating provided by rater i. Some or all of these param-
by providing foresight about service providers before pur-
chase. By using a reputation management scheme, a service 
provider's reputation can be formed based on the combina-
tion ofreceived ratings. 50 eters can evolve with time. However, for simplicity, time 
dependencies have been omitted from this exemplary nota-
tion. 
FIG. 1 illustrates a diagram of the reputation management 
system 100, according to an exemplary embodiment of the 
present disclosed technology. As shown in FIG. 1, transac-
tions may take place between a service provider 110 and a 
consumer. In an exemplary embodiment of the disclosed 55 
technology, the transactions may take place in a web environ-
ment, such as in the online sale of goods, or the provision of 
live information services as described in U.S. patent applica-
tion Ser. No. 12/431,535. Transactions may also occur in 
real-world settings, such as the purchase of food at a restau- 60 
rant by a diner. 
After a transaction, a consumer who receives the service or 
purchases a product can provide one or more reports about the 
quality of service provided, or ratings. Such consumers are 
hereinafter referred to as "raters" 120. In an exemplary 65 
embodiment, a service provider for a transaction can also be 
a rater for the same or a different transaction. 
In an exemplary embodiment, there can be s service pro-
viders and u raters in the system, i.e., ISl=s and IUl=u. The 
collection of variables representing the reputations of the 
service providers and the trustworthiness values of the raters 
can be represented as G={ G/jES} and R={R,:iEU}, respec-
tively. T can represent an sxu service-provider-rater matrix 
that stores the rating values (TiJ), and T, the set of ratings 
provider by rater i. 
Throughout the following examples, embodiments of the 
reputation management system will be described in slotted 
time. However, exemplary embodiments of the disclosed 
technology can also be performed in real-time. 
At each a time-slot, the iterative reputation algoritlnn can 
be executed using the input parameters Rand T to obtain the 
reputation parameters (e.g., G). After completing its itera-
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tions, the BP-ITRM scheme can output new global reputa-
tions of the service providers as well as the trustworthiness (R 
values) of the raters. For simplicity of explanation, the rating 
values in the following examples are assumed to be from the 
set Y ={ 0, 1}. However, in an exemplary embodiment, the 
rating values can take any real number. 
The reputation management problem can be viewed as 
finding the marginal probability distributions of each variable 
in G, given the observed data (i.e., evidence). There can be s 
marginal probability functions, p(G,IT,R), each of which can 
be associated with a variable Gi' the reputation value of SP j. 
Each marginal probability function p(G,IT,R) can be obtained 
as follows: 
10 
8 
rater i about SP j, the reputation management system 100 can 
update the value T iJ by averaging the new rating and the old 
value of the edge. 
In some embodiments, the old value of an edge can be 
multiplied with a fading factor. The fading factor can be used 
to give priority to older or more recent ratings. For example, 
the factory if( t) can be used to incorporate a fading factor of a 
service provider's reputation. In an exemplary embodiment, a 
known factoryiJ(t)=v'-'ij can be used, where v can be a fading 
parameter and tiJ can be the time when the previous transac-
tion occurred between rater i and SP j occurred. The param-
eterv can be chosen to give greater importance to more recent 
ratings, for example, by choosing a v less than one. In other 
15 embodiments, a parameter v can be greater than one to give 
greater importance to older ratings. 
p(GJ IT, R)= ~ p(GI T, R), 
'*1l 
(1) 
20 
where the notation G\{ G1} implies all variables in G except 
GJ" 
The global function p(GIT,R) can factor into products of 
several local functions, each local function having a subset of 
variables from Gas arguments as follows: 
1 
p(G IT, R) =Zn f;({];, T;, R;), 
'EU 
(2) 
where Z is the normalization constant and {i; is a subset ofG. 
Hence, in the graph representation, each factor node can be 
associated with a local function, and each local functionf, can 
represent the probability distributions of its arguments given 
Generally speaking, conventional Bayesian approaches 
solve for these marginal distributions separately, leading to 
poor estimates as these approaches neglect the interplay of the 25 
entire evidence. In contrast, embodiments of the disclosed 
technology can formulate the problem by considering the 
global function p(GIT,R), which is the joint probability dis-
tribution function of the variables in G given a rating matrix 
and the trustworthiness values of the raters. 
Unfortunately, the number of terms in Equation (1) grows 
exponentially with the number of variables, making compu-
tation infeasible for large-scale systems even for binary repu-
tation values. However, the disclosed technology can factor-
ize the global function in Equation (1) to local functions f, 35 
using a factor graph and utilize the belief propagation algo-
rithm to calculate the marginal probability distributions in 
linear complexity. 
30 the trustworthiness value and the existing ratings of the asso-
ciated rater. For example, the factor graph 200 as shown in 
FIG. 2 can correspond to: 
1 
p(G0 GbG, IT, R) = zfk(G0 , Gb, G" T,0 , T,b, T, 0 R,)x 
(3) 
fm(Ga, Gb, Tma• Tmb• Rm)Xfn(Ga, Geo Tna, Tmb• Rn). 
A. Factor Graph 
These marginal distributions can be calculated using Equa-
tion (3) with Equation (1 ). However, as previously discussed, 
this can be computationally infeasible. Alternatively, an 
exemplary embodiment of the disclosed technology can use 
A factor graph is a bipartite graph containing two sets of 40 
nodes (corresponding to variables and factors) and edges 
incident between the two sets. In an embodiment of the dis-
closed technology, the reputation management system can 
form a factor graph by setting a variable node for each vari-
able G1, a factor node for each function f ,, and an edge 
connecting variable node j to the factor node i if and only ifG1 
45 
messages passed between the factor nodes 220 and variable 
nodes 210 to compute the marginal distributions using belief 
propagation. As described herein, the word "message" is used 
as a virtual term. The exchange of messages is not between 
the actual service providers and raters; the messages between 
is an argument off,. 
FIG. 2 illustrates a representation of service providers and 
raters together with their associated relations as a factor graph 
200, according to an exemplary embodiment of the disclosed 
technology. As shown in FIG. 2, in this representation, each 
rater 120 corresponds to a factor node 220 in the graph, shown 
as a square. Each service provider 110 corresponds to a vari-
able node 210 shown as a hexagon in the graph. Each rating is 
represented by an edge from the factor node to the variable 
node. For example, if a rater i (iEU) has a report about SP j 
(jES), an edge can be placed with value T iJ from the factor 
node representing rater i to the variable node representing SP 
j. In an exemplary embodiment, a service provider that is also 
a rater can be represented as both a variable node and a factor 
node in the graph. The factor graph can be, for example and 
not limitation, implemented in a computer program as a 
matrix. Other suitable implementations will be apparent to 
one of skill in the art. 
The T iJ value between rater i and SP j can be the aggrega-
tion of all past and present ratings between these two peers. In 
an exemplary embodiment, after receiving a new rating from 
50 the nodes in the graph (i.e., between the variable and factor 
nodes) can be real-valued functions formed by the algorithm. 
B. Belief Propagation 
FIG. 3 illustrates an example factor graph 300, according 
an exemplary embodiment of the disclosed technology. When 
55 a factor graph has no cycles, computing marginal probability 
functions can be exact. However, the belief propagation algo-
rithm is still well defined and empirically often gives good 
approximate results for factor graphs with cycles. 
In an exemplary application of the belief propagation algo-
60 rithm, the set of neighbors of the variable node (service pro-
vider peer) a 211 and the factor node (rater peer) k 221, as 
shown in FIG. 3, can be represented as Na and Nk, respec-
tively. Neighbors ofa service provider peer are the set of rater 
peers who rated the service provider while neighbors of a 
65 rater peer are the service providers, whom it rated. In an 
exemplary notation, S and li. can represent Na\{k} and 
N k \ {a}, respectively. 
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and 1, the uncertainty can be uniformly distributed between 
two ou!comes. H~~ce in the eyes ofthe~thrater, Ga (v) is equal 
to 1 with probability (Rk(v-l)+(l-Rk(v 1))/2), and equal to 0 
with probability ((1-Rk Cv-l))/2).A similar statement holds for 
the case when T ka =O. 
The belief propagation algorithm can iteratively exchange 
probabilistic messages between the factor nodes 220 and the 
variable nodes 210 as shown in FIG. 3, updating the degree of 
beliefs on the reputation values of the service providers as 
well as the trustworthiness values of the raters on their ratings 5 
at each step, until a stopping condition is reached. In an 
exemplary embodiment, the stopping condition can be the 
convergence of one or more variables. In another embodi-
ment, the stopping condition can be a maximum number of 
iterations. 
For example, G(v)={G)"l:jES} can bethe collection of vari-
ables representing the values of the variable nodes at the 
iteration v of the algorithm. The messages from the variable 
nodes 210 to the factor nodes 220 can beµ and the messages 
from the factor nodes to the variables nodes can be A. The 15 
message µa~k(v)(Ga (v)) denotes the probability of G}v)=l, 
lE{0,1} at the vth iteration. On the other hand, "-k~}vl(Ga M) 
denotes the probability that Ga (v)=l,lE{0,1 }, at the vth itera-
tion given T ka and Rk. 
Although this may resemble the belief/plausibility concept 
of the Dempster-Shafer Theory (G. Shafer, "The Dempster-
Shafer Theory," Encyclopedia of Artificial Intelligence, 
1992), embodiments of the disclosed technology do not com-
bine the beliefs of the raters. Instead, the BP-ITRM algorithm 
10 
can consider the belief of each rater individually and calculate 
probabilities of Ga (v) being one and zero in the eyes of each 
rater, as in Equation (6). The above computation can be per-
formed for every neighbor of each factor node, concluding a 
During a first half of the vth iteration, the message from the 20 
factor node k 221 to the variable node a 211 at the vth iteration 
can be formed using the principles of the belief propagation as 
first half of the vth iteration. 
During a second halfof the vth iteration, the variable nodes 
can generate their messages µand send the messages to their 
neighbors. FIG. 5 illustrates a message transfer from the 
variable node a 211 to the factor node k 221 at the vth itera-
tion, according to an exemplary embodiment of the disclosed 
technology. Variable node a can form µa~k(v)(Ga M) by mul-
tiplying all information it receives from its neighbors exclud-
ing the factor node k, as shown in FIG. 5. Hence, the message 
from variable node a 211 to the factor node k 221 at the vth 
j,({],, T,, Rk'-11) n µ~::,~\G~-1\ iteration can be given by: (4) 25 
XE~ 
where [j k is the set of variable nodes which are the arguments 30 
of the local function f k at the factor node k. FIG. 4 illustrates 
a message transfer from factor node k 221 to variable node a 
211 at the vth iteration, according to an exemplary embodi-
ment of the disclosed technology. Rk (v-l)' the trustworthiness 
of rater k calculated at the end of (v-1 )th iteration, can be a 35 
value between zero and one, and calculated as follows: 
(5) 
40 
(7) 
This computation can be repeated for every neighbor of each 
variable node. 
The algorithm can process the subsequent iterations in the 
same way as the with iteration. The initial iteration can start 
by computing "-k~} 1 l(G} 1 l) in Equation (4). However, 
instead of the using results of calculating in Equation (5), the 
trustworthiness value Rk from the previous execution ofBP-
ITRM can be used as the initial values in (6). 
The iterations can stop when all variables in G converge 
(e.g., do not change from the last iteration). At the end of an 
iteration, the reputation value can be calculated for each ser-
vice provider. To calculate the reputation value Ga Cvl, 
µa (v)(Ga M) can be first computed using Equation (7) but 
The above equation can be interpreted as one minus the 
average inconsistency of rater k calculated by using the mes-
sages the corresponding node received from its neighbors. In 
an exemplary embodiment, raters with trustworthiness values 
below a threshold can be identified as unreliable or malicious. 
If raters identified as unreliable or malicious change behavior 
in the future, they may gain enough trustworthiness to be 
considered reliable. 
45 replacing S with Na, and then solving (Ga (v))=~;~o 1iµa (v)(i). 
Using Equation ( 4) and the fact that the reputation values in 
set G are independent from each other, it can be shown that 
"-k~a Cvl(Ga Cvl)cxp(Ga CvllTka,Rkcv-ll), where 
C. Computational Complexity 
The computational complexity of BP-ITRM may appear 
quadratic with the number of raters 120 (or service providers 
110) due to the use of the probability-domain message pass-
50 ing algorithm and the multiplications of probabilities in 
Equations (7) and ( 4 ). However, the quadratic computational 
complexity can be further reduced by using similar tech-
niques developed for message passing decoding oflow-den-
sity parity-check (LDPC) codes using belief propagation for 
55 lower complexity. For example, in an exemplary embodi-
(6) ment, a log-domain algorithm can be used, which is often 
used for LDPC codes to reduce the complexity. Assuming 
IUl=u raters and ISl=s service providers in the system, the 
computational complexity of BP-ITRM can be obtained 
60 through max(O(cu), O(cs)) in the number of multiplications, 
where c can be a small constant number representing the 
average number of ratings per rater. Given Tka=l, Rk(v-l) can be viewed as the belief ofthekth 
rater that Ga (v) is one (at the vth iteration). In other words, in 
the eyes of rater k, Ga (v) can be equal to 1 with probability 
Rk(v-l). Thus, (1-Rk(v-l)) corresponds to the uncertainty in 65 
the belief of rater k. In order to remove this uncertainty and 
express p(Ga (v)ITka' Rk(v-l)) as the probabilities that Ga (v) is 0 
III. SECURITY EVALUATION OF BP-ITRM 
In this section, BP-ITRM is mathematically modeled and 
analyzed. The analysis is supported by computer simulations 
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comparing BP-ITRM with existing and commonly used trust 
management schemes. In order to facilitate future references, 
frequently used notations are listed in Table 1. 
S The set of service providers (SPs) 
UM The set of malicious raters 
UR The set of reliable raters 
12 
designed using these criteria will also be robust against ballot 
stuffing and combinations of bad mouthing and ballot stuff-
ing; and 
Malicious raters attack the same set r of service providers 
at each time-slot. In other words, r is denoted by the set of 
size b in which every victim service provider has one edge 
from each of the malicious raters. 
E-Optimal Scheme. 
Rating provided by a reliable rater 
rm Rating provided by a malicious rater 
d Total number of newly generated ratings, per time-slot, per a reliable 
b 
rater. 
Total number of newly generated ratings, per time-slot, per malicious 
rater. 
The performance of a reputation scheme can be determined 
10 by its accuracy of estimating the global reputations of the 
service providers. In an exemplary embodiment of the dis-
closed technology, a reputation scheme is E-optimal if the 
mean absolute error (MAE) (IGrG)) is less than or equal to 
Two major attack methods commonly used against trust 
and reputation management schemes are "bad mouthing" and 
"ballot stuffing." 
In bad mouthing, malicious raters collude and attack the 
service providers with the highest reputation by giving low 
ratings in order to undermine the service providers. In some 
applications, bad mouthing may be originated by a group of 
selfish peers attempting to weaken high-reputation providers 
15 E for every service provider. This criterion introduces a class 
of optimal schemes and raises the question of: for a fixed E, 
what are the conditions to have an E-optimal scheme? In order 
to answer this question two conditions must be satisfied: 1) 
the scheme should iteratively reduce the impact of malicious 
in the hope of improving their own chances as providers. 
20 raters and decrease the error in the reputation values of the 
service providers until it converges, and 2) the error on the G1 
value of each SP j should be less than or equal to E once the 
scheme converges. The conditions to arrive at an E-optimal 
scheme can be defined as follows. 
In ballot stuffing, malicious raters collude to increase the 
reputation value of peers with low reputations. As in bad 
mouthing, in some applications, this could be mounted by a 
group of selfish raters attempting to favor their allies. 
25 The bad-mouthing attack is aimed to reduce the global 
reputation values of the victim service providers. Hence, the 
G1 value of a victim SP j should be a non-decreasing function 
of iterations. This leads to the first condition on an E-optimal 
scheme. 
Lemma 1 (Condition 1). In the following exemplary models, various assumptions are made for peers involved in the reputation system. Though 30 
not inclusive of every scenario, the models generally illustrate 
features of the disclosed technology. For example, even 
though the models assume binary values (0 or 1) for the actual 
reputation values of service providers, embodiments of BP-
ITRM also perform well and give accurate results when the 
actual reputation values of the service providers are between 
The error in the reputation values of the service providers 
decreases with successive iterations (until convergence) if 
Ga C2 l>Ga (l) a is satisfied with high probability for every ser-
vice provider a ( aES) with Ga= 1. The opposite must hold for 
35 any service provider with Ga =O 
Proof. 
0 and 1, or within a different predetermined range, as shown 
in the simulations section. 
In the following exemplary models, it is assumed that: 
Attackers can collude and collaborate with each other; 
The quality of each service provider remains unchanged 
LetGa (w) andGa (w+l)bethereputation value ofanarbitrary 
service provider a with Ga =1 calculated at the (w)th and 
(w+l)th iterations, respectively. Ga (w+l)>Ga (w) ifthe follow-
40 ing is satisfied at the (w+ 1 )th iteration: 
during time slots, and the rating values are either 0 or 1, where 
1 represents a good service quality; 
The total number of newly generated ratings, per time-slot, 
per a malicious rater is denoted as d, and d is a random 45 
variable with Yule-Simon distribution, which resembles a 
power-law distribution used in modeling online systems, with 
the probability mass functionf id; p)=pB(d, P+l), whereB is 
the Beta function; 
Ratings generated by non-malicious raters are distributed 50 
uniformly among the service providers (i.e., their ratings/ 
edges in the graph representation are distributed uniformly 
among service providers); 
The rating value rh (provided by the non-malicious raters) 
is a random variable with Bernoulli distribution, where 55 
Pr(rh =G)=pc and Pr(rh"'G)=(l-pc) andG1 of the global repu-
tation of SP j; 
To the advantage of malicious raters, it is assumed that a 
total ofT time-slots have passed since the initialization of the 
system and a fraction of the existing raters change behavior 60 
and become malicious after T time-slots. In other words, 
malicious raters behaved like reliable raters before mounting 
their attacks at the (T + 1 )th time-slot; 
Malicious raters initiate bad mouthing and collude while 
attacking the service providers who have the highest reputa- 65 
tion values by rating them as rm =O. Although the discussions 
of the analysis are based on bad-mouthing attacks, a system 
Where R1 (w) and R1 (w) are the trustworthiness values of a 
reliable and malicious rater calculated as in Equation (5) at 
the wth iteration, respectively. Further, UM is the set of mali-
cious raters and UR is the set ofreliable raters. 
If Ga (w)>Ga (w-l) holds at the wth iteration, then 
R}w)>R}w+l) for jEUJINa. Thus, Equation (8) would hold 
forthe (w+l)thiteration. On the other hand, ifGa (w)<Ga (w-l)' 
then R.Cw)<R(w+l) for J0 EU "N and R.Cw)<R(w) for 
7 7 M 1 a 7 7 jEURnNa. Hence, Equation (8) is not satisfied at the (w+l)th 
iteration. Therefore, if Ga c °' l>G a cw- l l holds for some iteration 
w, then an exemplary BP-ITRM algorithm can reduce the 
error on the global reputation value (GJ until the iterations 
stop, and hence, is sufficient to ~atisfy G}2l>G}1l with high 
probability for every SP j with G1=1 (the set of service pro-
viders from which the victims are taken) to guarantee that the 
exemplary BP-ITRM can iteratively reduce the impact of 
malicious raters until the algorithm stops. 
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As described previously, iterations of BP-ITRM can stop 
when the G1 values converge for every SP j. The .following 
lemma shows that BP-ITRM can converge to a umque solu-
tion given Condition 1 is satisfied. 
Lemma2. 
Given Condition 1 holds, the G1 value of SP j converges to 
a unique solution (G) 
Proof. 
From Lemma 1, the exemplary BP-ITRM can iteratively 
reduce the error in the reputation values of the service pro-
viders provided that Condition 1 is satisfied. Further, given 
Condition 1 is satisfied, the error in the reputation value of an 
arbitrary SP j can stop decreasing at the vth iteration when 
G}v)=G}v+I), where the value ofv depends on the fraction of 
malicious raters. Thus, given that the exemplary BP-ITRM 
satisfies Condition 1, the reputation value of every service 
provider converges to a unique value. 
14 
tant factor affecting the performance of the scheme. It was 
observed that given the exemplary BP-ITRM satisfies Con-
dition 1 (that the error in the reputation values of the service 
providers monotonically decreases with iterations), the prob-
5 ability of the exemplary BP-ITRM being an E-optimal 
scheme increases with time. This criteria is given by the 
following lemma: 
Lemma4. 
Let Pr+i and Pr+2 be the probabilities that the exemplary 
10 BP-ITRM is an E-optimal scheme at the (T + 1 )th and (T +2)th 
time-slows, respectively, Then, given Condition 1 holds at the 
(T + 1 )th time-slot, P r+2>P r+i. 
Proof. 
Due to the fading factor, the contributions of the past reli-
15 able ratings of the malicious raters to their R, values become 
less dominant with increasing time. Let R,(T) and R,(T) be the 
trustworthiness of a reliable and malicious rater at the Tth 
time-slot, respectively. Then, given that Condition 1 is satis-Although the error in the reputation values of the service 
providers decreases with successive iterations because of the 
Condition 1, it is unclear what would be the eventual impact 20 
of malicious raters. Hence, in the following, probability P for 
E-optimality is derived. 
fied at the (T + 1 )th time-slot, it can be shown that R,(T + 1 );;,;R, 
(T) and R,(T+l)<R,(T). Thus, the probability that the exem-
plary BP-ITRM satisfies Condition 1 increases at the (T +2)th 
time-slot. 
Lemma 3 (Condition 2). 
Suppose that the Condition 1 is met. Let v be the iteration 
at which the algorithm has converged. Then, the exemplary 25 
BP-ITRM would be an E-optimal scheme with probability P, 
where Pis given in (9) as follows: 
The following example illustrates the results of the above 
analytical evaluation. The parameters used were IU Ml+ 
IURl=lOO,p=l, v=0.9, T=50, b=5, andpc=0.8. The exemplary 
BP-ITRM was also evaluated with different parameters and 
obtained similar results. BP-ITRM can work properly when 
the error in the reputation values of the service providers 
decreases monotonically with iterations until convergence. In 
P= n Pr 
acS 
!E 2o 1 -l n (2p,R)v+ll + 1 - R)v+ll). n (1 - R~v+llll/ )EURnNa jEUMnNa 
l n (2p,Ryv+ll + 1 - R)v+ll) n (1 - R~v+ll) + )EURnNa )EUM nNa 
30 other words, Condition 1 (in Lemma 1) can be a fundamental 
requirement. 
FIG. 6 illustrates the probability of an exemplary 
BP-ITRM to satisfy Condition 1 versus different fractions of 
malicious raters, according to an exemplary embodiment of 
35 the disclosed technology. It was observed that the exemplary 
BP-ITRM satisfies Condition 1 with a high probability for up 
to 30 percent malicious raters. Further, a threshold phenom-
enon was observed. That is, the probability ofBP-ITRM to 
satisfy Condition 1 can suddenly drop after exceeding a par-
40 ticular fraction of malicious raters. 
FIG. 7 illustrates the probability of an exemplary 
BP-ITRM being an E-optimal scheme versus different frac-
tions of malicious raters forthree different E values, according 
to an exemplary embodiment of the disclosed technology. 
45 Again, a threshold phenomenon was observed. As shown in 
Proof. FIG. 7, as the fraction of adversary exceeds a certain value, 
Given Condition 1 is satisfied, Ga value of an arbitrary theprobabilityofBP-ITRMbeinganE-optimalschemedrops 
service provider a (with Ga= 1) increases with iterations. Let sharply. 
the exemplary BP-ITRM converge at the vth iteration. Then, FIG. 8 illustrates the average E values (EaJ for which an 
to have an E-optimal scheme, Ga value calculated at the last 50 exemplary BP-ITRMis an E-optimal schemewithhighprob-
iteration of the exemplary BP-ITRM should result in an error ability for different fractions of malicious raters, according to 
less than or equal to E for every service provider. That is, the an exemplary embodiment of the disclosed technology. It was 
following should hold for every service provider: observed that BP-ITRM provides significantly small error 
1-G}v>"E values for up to 30 percent malicious raters. These analytical 
Further, ifthe exemplary scheme continues one more itera- 55 results are also consistent with the simulation results that are 
illustrated in the next section. tion after convergence, it can be shown that: 
Thus, combining Equation (10) and Equation (11) leads to 
Equation (9). 
Conditions 1 and 2 in Lemmas 1 and 3 are to give an insight 
about the performance of the algorithm prior to the imple-
mentation. Hence, these conditions do not need to be checked 
at each execution of the exemplary BP-ITRM in the real-life 
implementation of the algorithm. 
Finally, the variation of the probability of the exemplary 
BP-ITRM being an E-optimal scheme over time is an impor-
IV. SIMULATIONS 
60 The results provided in this section are based on the 
example attack model described above and evaluate the per-
formance for the time-slot (T + 1 ). The performance of an 
exemplary BP-ITRM is compared with three well known and 
commonly used reputation management schemes: 1) The 
65 Averaging Scheme, 2) Bayesian Approach, and 3) Cluster 
Filtering. The Averaging Scheme is used in eBay® and Ama-
zon®. 
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Fourth Int'! Conj Security and Privacy in Comm. Networks 
(Secure Comm '08), pp. 1-11, 2008), which has been shown to 
be a strong attack. 
The Bayesian Approach updates G1 using a Beta distribu-
tion. Buchegger's Bayesian approach was implemented for 
the comparison with the deviation threshold d=0.5 and trust-
worthiness threshold t=0.75. (S. Buchegger and J. Boudec, 
"Coping with False Accusations in Misbehavior Reputation 
Systems for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks," Technical Report 
IC/2003/31, EPFL-DI-ICA, 2003.) Since this exemplary BP-
ITRM is presented in a centralized setting, Buchegger' s work 
may be considered as similar. However, Buchegger's 
approach is susceptible to colluding malicious raters. 
Buchegger' s approach first calculates the reputation value 
Further, it was assumed that the rating rh (provided by the 
non-malicious raters) is a random variable with Bernoulli 
distribution, Pr(rh =G)=0.8 andPr(rh"'G)=0.2. Thus, the Rep-
Trap attack scenario becomes even more severe. FIGS. 9-15 
illustrate simulations of BP-ITRM and various schemes, 
according to exemplary embodiments of the disclosed tech-
lO nology. The plots in FIGS. 9-15 are shown from the time-slot 
the adversary introduced its attack. 
First, the MAE performance of BP-ITRM was evaluated 
for different fractions of malicious raters 
of a particular service provider, and then based on the calcu-
lated value, adjusts each rater's trustworthiness value. When 
the malicious raters collude (as in a worst-case attack see- 15 
nario ), it is likely that the majority of the ratings to the victim 
service providers will be from malicious raters. In this sce-
nario, the Bayesian approach not only fails to filter the mali-
cious ratings but it also punishes the reliable raters which 
rates the victim service providers. This shortcoming will 
become apparent in the disclosed simulations. 
20 at different time-slots. FIG. 9 illustrates a simulation of the 
Cluster Filtering on the other hand performs a dissimilarity 
test among the raters and then updates G1 using only the 
reliable raters. BP-ITRM is also compared with the inventors' 
previous work on iterative trust and reputation management 25 
(ITRM) to show the benefit of using belief propagation. 
MAE performance of an exemplary BP-ITRM versus time 
when W of the existing raters become malicious under the 
RepTrap attack, according to an exemplary embodiment of 
the present disclosed technology. It was observed from the 
simulation that BP-ITRM provides significantly low errors 
for up to W=30% malicious raters. Moreover, the MAE at the 
first time slot is consistent with the analytical evaluation 
which was illustrated in FIG. 7. 
In the following simulations, various assumptions were 
made for peers involved in the reputation system to simulate 
worst-case scenario malicious attacks. It was assumed that: 
The total number of newly generated ratings, per time-slot, 
per a malicious rater is denoted as d, and d is a random 
variable with Yule-Simon distribution (with p=l 
throughout the simulations); 
Next, the change in the average trustworthiness (R, values) 
30 of malicious raters with time was observed. FIG. 10 illustrates 
The fading parameter is set as v=0.9 and number ofratings, 
per time-slot, by a malicious rater as b=5. The Averaging 35 
Scheme, Bayesian Approach, and Cluster Filtering were 
also configured to use the same fading mechanism with 
fading parameterv=0.9. 
Malicious raters collude and attack the service providers 
who have the highest reputation values (assuming that 40 
the attackers knows the reputation values) and received 
the lowest number of ratings from the reliable raters 
(assuming that the attackers have this information). This 
assumption may not hold in practice since the actual 
values of the global reputations and number of ratings 45 
received by each service provider may not be available 
to malicious raters. However, it was assumed that this 
information is available to malicious raters to consider 
the worst case scenario; 
Malicious raters collude and attack the same set r of ser- 50 
vice providers in each time-slot (which represents the 
strongest attack by the malicious raters); and 
a simulation of the change in average trustworthiness of mali-
cious raters versus time for an exemplary BP-ITRM when W 
of the existing raters become malicious under the Rep Trap 
attack, according to an exemplary embodiment of the present 
disclosed technology. A drop in the trustworthiness of the 
malicious raters with time was observed. It was concluded 
that the R, values of the malicious raters decrease over time, 
and hence, the impact of their malicious ratings is totally 
neutralized over time. 
FIG. 11 illustrates a simulation of the average number of 
iterations versus time for an exemplary BP-ITRM when W of 
the existing raters malicious become under the RepTrap 
attack, according to an exemplary embodiment of the present 
disclosed technology. From the results, it was concluded that 
that the average number of iterations for BP-ITRM decreases 
with time and decreasing fraction of malicious raters. 
Finally, MAE performance of BP-ITRM was compared 
with the other schemes. FIG. 12 illustrates a simulation of the 
MAE performance of various schemes when 30 percent of the 
existing raters become malicious under the RepTrap attack, 
according to an exemplary embodiment of the present dis-
closed technology. It is clear from the results that BP-ITRM 
outperforms all the other techniques significantly. 
The same attack scenario was simulated when ratings were 
There are IUl=lOO rater peers and ISl=lOO service-pro-
vider peers. Moreover, a total of T=50 time-slots have 
passed since the launch of the system and reliable 
reports generated during those time-slots were distrib-
uted among the service providers uniformly. 
For the first set of simulations, it was assumed that a frac-
tion of the existing raters change behavior and become mali-
cious after the start of the system (i.e., at time-slot one). The 
rating values were either 0 or 1. Using all their edges, the 
malicious raters colluded and attacked the service providers 
who have the highest reputation values and received the low-
est number of ratings from the reliable raters, by rating them 
as rm=O. This attack scenario represents the RepTrap attack 
(Y. Yang, Q. Feng, Y. L. Sun, and Y. Dai, "Rep Trap: a Novel 
Attack on Feedback-Based Reputation Systems," Proc. 
55 integers from the set {1, ... , 5} instead of binary values. It 
was assumed that the rating rh is a random variable with 
folded normal distribution (mean G1 and variance 0.5). Mali-
cious raters choose service providers from rand rate them as 
rm =4. Malicious raters do not deviate very much from the 
60 actual GJ=5 values to remain undercover (while still attack-
ing) as many time-slots as possible. Higher deviations from 
the G J value were tried and it was observed that the malicious 
raters were easily detected by BP-ITRM. 
FIG.13 illustrates a simulation of the MAE performance of 
65 an exemplary BP-ITRM versus time when W of the existing 
raters become malicious and rating values are integers from 
{1, ... , 5} under the Rep Trap attack, according to an exem-
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plary embodiment of the present disclosed technology. It was 
observed that BP-ITRM provides significantly low MAE for 
up to W=40% malicious raters. 
FIG. 14 illustrates a simulation of the MAE performance of 
various schemes when 30 percent of the existing raters 
become malicious and rating values are from {1, ... , 5} under 
the RepTrap attack, according to an exemplary embodiment 
of the present disclosed technology. It was observed that 
BP-ITRM outperforms all the other techniques significantly. 
In many trust and reputation management systems, the 10 
adversary causes the most serious damage by introducing 
newcomer raters to the system. Since it is not possible for the 
system to know the trustworthiness of the newcomer raters, 
the adversary may introduce newcomer raters to the systems 
and attack the service providers using those raters. To study 15 
the effect of newcomer malicious raters to the reputation 
management scheme, 100 more raters were introduced as 
newcomers. Hence, there were IUMl+IUR1=200 raters and 
IS I= 100 service providers in total. The rating values are either 
0 or 1, rh is a random variable with Bernoulli distribution as 20 
before, and malicious raters choose service providers from r 
and rate them as rm =O (this particular attack scenario does not 
represent the RepTrap attack). 
FIG.15 illustrates a simulationofthe MAE performance of 
various schemes when 30 percent of the newcomer raters are 25 
malicious, according to an exemplary embodiment of the 
present disclosed technology. It was concluded that 
BP-ITRM significantly outperforms the Averaging Scheme, 
Bayesian Approach, and Cluster Filtering in the presence of 
attackers. The Bayesian Approach (Buchegger) was identi- 30 
fied as performing the worst against the RepTrap attack and 
colluding attacks from malicious raters. ITRM (i.e., an alge-
braic iterative scheme) was identified as the closest in accu-
racy to BP-ITRM, emphasizing the robustness of using itera-
tive message passing algorithms for reputation management. 35 
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top boxes, progranmiable consumer electronics, network 
PCs, minicomputers, mainframe computers, distributed com-
puting environments that include any of the above systems or 
devices, and the like. 
The server 150 can comprise the same or similar compo-
nents as the client computers 50. In an exemplary embodi-
ment, the server can comprise a central authority 140. Addi-
tionally, in some exemplary embodiments, the server 150 can 
comprise a server assembly distributed across two or more 
computing devices. Portions of computer-readable instruc-
tions on the server 150 can include, for example, instructions 
for implementing server-side processes of the reputation 
management system 100, such as a ratings collection unit or 
reputation management unit. Such server-side processes can 
include collecting and processing ratings from the client com-
puters 50, as well computing and maintaining reputation and 
trustworthiness values for service providers 120 and raters 
110, respectively. Additionally, ifthe reputation management 
system 100 comprises one or more web application programs, 
the server 150 can support one or more websites, through 
which the client computers 50 can access the reputation man-
agement system 100 via web clients. In some embodiments, 
the clients can provide ratings to the server via website. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As described above, the reputation management system 
100 can provide an accurate, robust, and scalable scheme that 
is also resilient to various ways a reputation system can be 
attacked. While the reputation management system 100 has 
been disclosed in exemplary forms, it will be apparent to 
those skilled in the art that many modifications, additions, and 
deletions may be made without departing from the spirit and 
scope of the system, method, and their equivalents, as set 
forth in the following claims. 
The invention claimed is: 
V. EXEMPLARY SYSTEMS 
As shown in FIG. 1, the reputation management system 
100 can comprise one or more computers 50 and one or more 
servers 150. The computers 50 can connect to each other and 
to a server 150 by one or more networks, such as the Internet 
170. Accordingly, the computers 50 and the server 150 can be 
1. A computer program product embodied in a computer-
readable medium, the computer program product comprising 
an algorithm adapted to effectuate a method for reputation 
40 management, the method comprising: 
in communication with one another. 
Exemplary embodiments of the reputation management 45 
system 100 can be described in a general context of computer-
executable instructions, such as one or more applications or 
program modules. Such computer-readable instructions can 
be stored on one or more computer-readable media associated 
with the computers 50 or the server 150, and can executed by 50 
one or more computer processing units on the computers 50 
receiving a plurality of ratings, wherein each rating is asso-
ciated with a service provider and a rater; 
modeling the service providers, the raters, and the ratings 
as a factor graph representing the factorization of a joint 
probability distribution function of variables; 
wherein each factor node corresponds to a rater and is 
associated with a local function representing marginal 
distributions of a subset of the variables, the subset com-
prising a trustworthiness value associated with the rater 
and one or more ratings associated with the rater; 
wherein each variable node corresponds to a service pro-
vider and the service provider is associated with a repu-
tation value; 
calculating the marginal distributions using a belief propa-
gation algorithm applied to the factor graph; and 
determining reputation values associated with the service 
providers and trustworthiness values associated with the 
raters based on the calculating. 
or the server 150. Generally, program modules can include 
routines, programs, objects, components, or data structures 
that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract 
data types. Embodiments of the system 100 can also be prac- 55 
ticed in distributed computing environments where tasks are 
performed by remote processing devices that are linked 
through the network 170. In a distributed computing environ-
ment, program modules can be located in both local and 
remote computer storage media and devices. 
Each computer 50 can be selected from various general 
purpose and special purpose computing devices and comput-
ing systems. For example, and not limitation, well-known 
computing systems, environments, and/or configurations that 
may be suitable for use with the invention include personal 65 
computers, server computers, hand-held or laptop devices, 
multiprocessor systems, microprocessor-based systems, set 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein calculating comprises 
60 iteratively passing messages between factor nodes and vari-
able nodes connected by an edge; and 
wherein an edge connecting a factor node and a variable 
node represents one or more ratings associated with a 
rater and a service provider corresponding to the factor 
node and variable node, respectively. 
3. The method of claim 2, wherein messages are passed 
until a termination conditions is reached. 
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4. The method of claim 3, wherein the termination condi-
tion is reached when the determined reputation values for one 
or more of the service providers remain constant between at 
least two iterations. 
5. The method of claim 2, wherein a message from a 
variable node to the factor node represents a probability that 
a reputation value associated with the corresponding service 
provider equals a certain value at a current iteration; and 
20 
a plurality of raters, each rater associated with a trustwor-
thiness value; 
a ratings collection unit configured to receive ratings, each 
rating associated with a service provider from the plu-
rality of service providers and a rater from the plurality 
of raters; 
a reputation management unit configured to calculate repu-
tation values and trustworthiness values using a belief 
propagation algorithm. wherein a message from a factor node to a variable node 
represents a probability that a reputation value associ- 10 
ated with a corresponding service provider equals acer-
tain value given one or more ratings between the corre-
sponding service provider and a corresponding rater and 
the trustworthiness value associated with the corre-
sponding rater at the current iteration. 
15. The system of claim 14, the reputation management 
unit configured to calculate reputation values in slotted time. 
16. The system of claim 14, the ratings collection unit 
configured to receive ratings and the reputation management 
15 unit configured to calculate reputation values in real time. 
17. The system of claim 14, wherein one or more service 
providers are raters. 
6. The method of claim 2, further comprising receiving an 
additional rating associated with a first service provider and a 
first rater; and 
updating an edge corresponding to the first service pro-
vider and first rater based on the additional rating and a 
priority factor. 
7. The method of claim 6, wherein the priority factor is 
based at least partially on a time elapsed since receiving a 
prior rating associated with the first service provider and the 
first rater. 
8. The method of claim 6, wherein the priority factor gives 
greater importance to more recent ratings. 
9. The method of claim 2, wherein a computational com-
plexity of calculating is linear in the number of service pro-
viders and raters. 
10. The method of claim 2, wherein the belief propagation 
algorithm is in log domain. 
11. The method of claim 2, wherein the mean absolute error 
18. The system of claim 14, configured to flag raters that 
have a trustworthiness value lower than a predetermined 
20 threshold. 
19. The system of claim 18, configured to filter malicious 
ratings associated with a flagged rater. 
20. A computer-implemented method embodied in a non-
transitory medium for determining reputation values of sell-
25 ers and trustworthiness values of buyers in a marketplace 
represented by a factor graph model, the model including a 
plurality of variable nodes and function nodes corresponding 
to the sellers and buyers, respectively, the variable nodes and 
function nodes linked by edges representing ratings of a seller 
30 provided by a buyer, comprising: 
receiving an additional rating associated with a first seller 
and a first buyer; 
of the determined reputation values is less than or equal to a 
predetermined error threshold E for each of the service pro- 35 
viders. 
updating an edge corresponding to the first seller and first 
buyer based on the additional rating and a priority factor, 
wherein the priority factor gives greater importance to 
more recent ratings 12. The method of claim 2, wherein the raters and service 
providers are buyers and sellers in a marketplace. 
13. The method of claim 2, wherein the service providers 
and raters are nodes on a computer network. 
14. A system for reputation management comprising: 
a plurality of service providers, each service provider asso-
ciated with a reputation value; 
40 
calculating the reputation values of sellers and trustworthi-
ness values of buyers using a belief propagation algo-
rithm applied to the model; 
flagging buyers with a calculated trustworthiness value 
below a certain threshold. 
* * * * * 
